Introduction
Scholars have debated the merits as well as the potentially problematic implications of framing different problems as issues of ÔsecurityÕ since the early 1990s. Early concern focused on the potential problems with linking environmental issues with security, and has since also turned specifically to the climate [1] [2] [3] , and energy [4] [5] [6] . The Copenhagen School developed the concept of ÔsecuritizationÕ to conceptualise what happens when particular threats are labelled as issues of security by elite actors 7 . They argued that if an issue is successfully securitized, it moves from the realm of regular politics into the realm of security, where emergency measures are legitimised and where they are treated differently: using Ôthreat, defense, and often state-centred solutionsÕ 8 . Thus, while securitization can be beneficial, attracting attention and extra resources to address an issue, it can also have potentially negative consequences: this has been the focus of a growing number of studies on climate and energy politics. However, it is only recently that this debate has begun to pay attention to China. Energy and climate concerns are of increasing importance to China: the sheer scale of its energy consumption and air pollution struggles dwarf the challenges seen by other states, and its policy choices play a key role in shaping global climate and energy dynamics. So, how China frames its energy and climate policy matters.
Studies of securitization have been accompanied by a debate over the widening of the concept of security, discussing both the merits and perils of broadening the concept to include issues beyond military security, often referred to as Ônon-traditionalÕ security issues. In the climate and energy fields, security has been studied in a wide range of ways. Energy is often considered a more traditional security issue as it tends to be linked with national security 9 , and as a result securitization of energy has only been studied more recently, with key contributions from Nyman and Leung et al 6, 10 . Meanwhile, studies of climate change and security have ranged from studying the potential for climate change to lead to conflict, to arguing that climate change should be seen as a non-traditional security issue and treated in non-militarised ways [1] [2] [3] 11 .
This focus article provides an overview of securitization in Chinese climate and energy policy debates. It starts by reviewing scholarship on securitization theory and China, illustrating that while the dynamics of securitization are different in non-Western countries, securitization still occurs. It then briefly discusses energy security and climate concerns in China, before turning to the role of ÔsecurityÕ in Chinese energy and climate politics. Here, we begin with a discussion of the academic literature, reviewing nascent existing literature on security and securitization in Chinese energy and climate debates. The focus is on the internal Chinese academic debate, but some relevant literature in English is also considered. The following section looks at the official discourse of the Chinese government, considering the role of security in discussions of energy and climate issues. We conclude with some reflection on the implications. Overall, we note increasing interest and focus on security and securitization in ChinaÕs energy and climate politics: we suggest that this is both interesting and important, but not necessarily a negative development. We suggest that a contextualised approach is needed for studying securitization in practice, in particular when studying securitization in a non-Western context.
Securitization theory and China
Securitization theory developed as an analytical framework to understand how issues become security, and the consequences of this process. It presents perhaps the most influential account of what security is and how it works. The Copenhagen School argued that security is a Ôspeech-actÕ. Thus, securitization is a discursive process through which Ôan issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; by labelling it as security an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary meansÕ 7 . Drawing on Austin, they suggested that security is performative: that speaking it is an act. Consequently, the label ÔsecurityÕ is not simply a reflection of a reality where something is a security issue. It is a political choice, with consequences. However, a securitizing move only results in successful securitization if that move is accepted by the relevant audience, which is more likely if the issue is framed using the grammar of security, if the speaker is in a position of authority, and if the external context and features of the threat makes the designation seem realistic 7 . If and when securitization is successful, the threat tends to be addressed in specific ways: the issue is moved out of regular democratic politics and fast-tracked, it is no longer subject to rules which normally bind and can be treated by extraordinary means. As a result, the Copenhagen School suggest securitization is usually best avoided.
Securitization theory has become a popular analytical framework for studying the increasing number of issues which have been labeled ÔsecurityÕ [12] [13] [14] . It has also been subject to a number of critiques. The limitations of securitization theory have been discussed elsewhere 15 , with key critiques highlighting security constructions beyond speech (including visual representations and physical action), the problematic implications of leaving power in the hands of elites, and the need to better understand the role of audience acceptance [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . However, despite critiques it has remained central to attempts to understand both the processes and the consequences of security construction.
Here, the critiques worthy of more detailed consideration relate to the Western-centric nature of securitization theory. The vast majority of work drawing on securitization theory focuses on Western liberal-democratic systems and it is often assumed that the framework does not work in other contexts. The Copenhagen School define the process of securitization as one which moves issues out of regular democratic politics and debate and into fast-tracked emergency national security politics. This clearly relies on a society where liberal democratic politics represents the ÔnormalÕ state of affairs and security represents the exception, and as a result the usefulness of securitization theory in different political systems has been questioned. Most obviously, how do you identify securitization if there is no move from liberal democratic politics to fast-tracked emergency politics? Likewise, securitization is a process of legitimation, a justification to an audience for treating an issue differently. If the audience (in the form of the general public) does not have the power to influence politics, what happens to the Copenhagen SchoolÕs emphasis on audience acceptance as necessary for a successful securitizing move? WilkinsonÕs study of Kyrgyzstan suggests that securitization theory is useable outside Europe, but that one must pay attention to local contexts and be careful not to oversimplify or generalise based on Western experience 23 .
A number of issues arise when you try to study securitization in China: most importantly, because of the political system the relationship between the state and society is inevitably going to be different. There has been little in-depth research on the usefulness of securitization theory in China, with the exception of VuoriÕs work 24, 25 . He found that while legitimacy and authority do work differently, securitization still occurs and securitizing moves still have to be accepted by an audience: leaders still Ôhave had the need and urge to appeal to the masses for supportÕ 24 . Securitization theory relies on an audience that needs to be convinced of the legitimacy and necessity of action. In China, this can be the general public, but depending on the issue and the context the audience can also be the elite: Ôwho has to be convinced of the necessity of security action changes with the cultural and political...[context]Õ 24 . Critiques have suggested that systems that are not liberal-democratic have no need for securitization, as there is no need to convince the audience of the need for emergency action. However, Vuori shows that the use and construction of security issues Ôcan be utilized for a range of political purposes, from raising an issue on the agenda of decision-making to legitimating policies, deterring threats, and controlling subordinatesÕ; it also helps to maintain the political system in China 24 . Here, it is important to note that the Chinese government associate security closely with national security, the security of the state 10 . In that sense, it is quite closely aligned with the Copenhagen SchoolÕs conception of security.
International Relations and Security Studies are still relatively young fields of study in China, and while there is much discussion of security, securitization theory has not been widely used either in China or to study Chinese politics. As Vuori has illustrated, the dynamics of securitization processes differ, but the approach can still tell us something interesting about energy and climate security politics in China.
Energy security and climate concerns in China
China was relatively late to industrialise, but with industrialisation and opening up from the late 1980s energy demand increased, and China became increasingly reliant on imports of crude and processed fuels 26 . Energy security became an area of attention in 1993, when it went from being a net oil exporter to being a net oil importer. Energy was long characterised as a Ôdomestic economic development issueÕ rather than an issue of national security, with a few exceptions including pipeline locations or border disputes where energy resources play a part 27 . However, as China became a net-oil importer and as energy demand continued to rise, energy security ( , nengyuan anquan) has risen up the priority agenda. It has become increasingly important, and sufficient and reliable energy supplies at reasonable prices is now considered to be Ôcrucial to national values and objectives and underpins, in part, the partyÕs governanceÕ 28 . It is increasingly framed as an issue of national security. However, as in most states, there is ongoing debate over the extent to which energy security should be left to the market or controlled more tightly by the state due to its strategic importance 29 .
ChinaÕs growing energy demand has proven difficult to satisfy. Energy security policy has emphasised self-sufficiency, which has been a big factor in the countryÕs continuing heavy dependence on domestically available coal (alongside easy availability and cost). ChinaÕs rate of self-sufficiency has remained much higher than that of most developed countries, at around 90% and it became the world's largest energy producer during the 11th Five-Year period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] 30 . This period also saw huge increases in domestic production of coal, doubled gas production, some increase in oil production, and a big growth in renewable energy 30 . While coal is largely domestically produced, more than half of oil consumption relies on imports 31 . As a result, oil is often at the centre of Chinese energy security discussions: Ôenergy securityÕ has been a ÔbuzzwordÕ in China since 2000, when oil imports doubled 28 . Growing oil imports have also been framed as a security risk as they represent dependence on other states and transport routes which may not be available in times of crisis.
In terms of actual policy energy is still a relatively recent priority, and the first white paper on energy did not appear until 2007. China has not had an energy ministry since 1993 and energy administration, policy and planning duties are in the hands of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a central planning agency responsible for national economic and social development. Within the NDRC, the National Energy Administration (NEA) is a subdepartment in charge of energy policy since 2008 32 . On top of this, a National Energy Commission was established in 2010, with the Prime Minister as its head Ôto step up strategic policy-making and coordinationÕ 33 . This also illustrates the growing importance of strategic and security thinking on energy.
Climate change is also an issue of growing importance in China and its impacts are already seen. Its own government assessment notes that ÔChina is one of the countries most vulnerable to the adverse impact of climate changeÕ and it is an issue to which the government Ôattaches great importanceÕ 34 . Energy consumption has risen with economic growth, which remains a key pillar of legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and thus also underpins political stability. But it has also made China the biggest greenhouse gas emitter globally and alongside larger impacts on the global climate, air pollution is a growing problem in its cities. The government is increasingly aware both of the scale of the problem and the potential future risks it poses. While climate change may not directly cause conflict, it is generally regarded as a Ôthreat-multiplierÕ: in China, it is likely to have a severe impact on food and water security as well as human livelihoods, with an increase in disease and growing numbers of climate refugees from the most heavily affected areas 35 . Social stability is a constant concern of Chinese leaders, and environmental issues (particularly air pollution) are a growing source of discontent.
In Beijing, the central government is still developing its approach to the issue, as can be seen in the response to the popular 2015 documentary on smog, Under the Dome: the Ministry of Environmental Protection initially praised the film, but it was later removed from Chinese internet sites. It also demonstrates the diverse interests of key actors within the Chinese political system. Given that Under the Dome points to the monopoly of Chinese energy and urges further energy reform, it was not welcomed by, for example, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), a Chinese state-owned oil and gas corporation and the largest integrated energy company. According to the Vice Chief Engineer of the CNPC Wan Zhanxiang, Ôperhaps she [the producer of the film] doesnÕt have enough brain power, or she doesnÕt have adequate knowledge. Anyways, there is not much true wisdom in this filmÕ 36 . This debate also exposes the opposing views over approaches to energy security: market-centred or strategic 29 . The film urges more marketization in the field of energy Ð which may harm the interests of the current statemonopolies. The diverse (and often vested) interests within the Chinese political system have made a coherent understanding and policy response to climate change and energy security more difficult.
Not surprisingly, the policy response has been mixed so far. A report released by the NDRC in 2013 noted that ÔChina is poorly prepared to tackle the impact of climate change that presents a serious threat to the countryÉdue to a lack of planning and public awarenessÕ 37 . Bigger targets are set in Five Year Plans, with follow-up white papers setting more detailed targets. The first climate change plan was released by the NDRC in 2007 38 and it rapidly rose to become an issue of national priority. Notably, the 12 th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) focuses heavily on both energy and climate issues. While policies are developed in a number of government departments including the NDRC and the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the National Leading Committee on Climate Change (formerly the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change) coordinates targets across ministries, headed by the Chinese Premier. China is setting increasingly ambitious domestic emissions and climate mitigation targets, and alongside this the rhetoric is being stepped up: in March 2014 Premier Li Keqiang declared a Ôwar on pollutionÕ. Energy security has traditionally taken precedence but focus on efficiency and diversification (as policies undertaken in the name of energy security) has also had a positive impact on climate security 39 .
Air pollution has also emerged as a separate security issue in China, especially as the haze has become more visible to ordinary people and contributed to environmental protest movements. This rising dissatisfaction is in itself a potential threat to state stability in China. However, discussions of the solutions to air pollution still focus on energy security. For example, in ChinaÕs first national security bluebook, air pollution is considered as a threat to ChinaÕs national security 40 . Here, the lesson of ChinaÕs haze is that Ôthe traditional energy security thinking Ð that focuses on oil security Ð can no longer accommodate the actual needs of ChinaÕs energy development. Energy security is not only a problem of diplomacy and benefit game internationally but also an urgent need of economic transition and improving public health domesticallyÕ 40 .
Before moving on to review the Chinese academic debate and official discourse, a brief note on methodology. In terms of the secondary material surveyed, the discussion of the Chinese academic debate focuses on articles published in Chinese journals. Our sampling was carried out in April 2015 and centred on the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Database (http://www.cnki.net/), which is the largest journal database in China and includes most if not all Chinese journal articles published and available online. We discuss in more detail the (much smaller number of) articles which explicitly deal with either securitization and energy/climate change or which consider energy and/or climate change as security issues. The database also works as a repository of articles for Chinese researchers, which makes it a particularly important tool in our survey as they are likely to be widely read. Most of the articles surveyed are in Chinese, though some are Chinese translations of English articles appearing in Chinese journals, indicating considerable Chinese academic interests in the area. We do supplement this with some international English language articles, where these are considered particularly relevant (in most cases because these provide additional surveys of specific aspects of the literatures considered here).
In the analysis and discussion of primary material in the final section which looks at official discourse, we used focused sampling to provide a survey of key documents and statements, drawing on work from a larger study by one of the authors. Here, NeumannÕs selection criteria emphasising key texts as ÔmonumentsÕ have been used: these play a central place in the policy debate, have broad reception, and are often cited 41 . One of the authors has also conducted interviews with key thinkers on ChinaÕs energy security, which have informed the broader framing of this article.
The views and research focus of Chinese scholars does sometimes vary with their institutions, geographic location, and funding sources 42 . There is some connection worth noting between authors focusing on non-traditional security and relevant research centers Ð such as the ecological security article noted in reference 69, which was written by Wang Jiangli of the Center for Non-traditional Security and Peaceful Development. However, our sample is too small, and the information about authorsÕ potential connections and funding too opaque, to conclude that views are shaped by the institution, location or funding.
The academic debate: security in ChinaÕs climate and energy policy discussions
This section reviews the existing academic literature on security and securitization in ChinaÕs energy security and climate change debates. It begins with energy security, before moving onto the literature on climate change. While there is much discussion of security, securitization theory has not been widely used. We have found some uses of the approach with energy and climate change in Chinese journals, as well as some uses in English language journals. Alongside this, we also consider articles which do not explicitly use securitization theory, but consider the role of energy or climate change specifically as security issues.
Security in ChinaÕs energy debates
As with many other concepts that are imported from the West, energy security is very much an evolving notion in China. As such, there is no fixed definition, and officials and policy-makers use the term Òenergy securityÓ in different ways. While some argue that energy supply has always been considered a security issue in China, our examination of Chinese academic journals in the CNKI database finds the term Ôenergy securityÕ appearing in 1989 and only really becoming a widespread topic of interest in the early 2000s (see Figure 1 ). While this does not necessarily mean that energy was not considered a security issue prior to this, it does illustrate a growing interest in the issue, and growing acceptance of the term.
[insert Figure 1 here] Chinese academic articles on energy security can be divided into two major areas of focus. Most relevant for our discussion is the focus on ChinaÕs energy security and policy analysis, which emerges in 1998. Alongside this, there is also considerable interest in how other countries protect and define their energy security, and its implications for China. Interest in the problem of energy security also goes beyond academia, with the first decade of the 2000s seeing Ôa growing number of government officials, military officers, think-tank experts and academics publicly pontificating on the subjectÕ 43 . However, interest in how, specifically, energy is understood as a security issue is very recent. Most of the more high profile discussions of energy as a national security issue focus on oil supply, increasing reliance on imported oil and the possibility of interrupted oil supplies. Focus on the state and self-reliance is central: security is generally equated with preserving and ensuring the survival and existence of the PRC.
While securitization theory has not been widely used either in China or to study Chinese politics, we have found some examples relevant to energy security debates. A translated article by ¯ystein Tunsj¿ in a leading Chinese journal discusses securitization and ChinaÕs energy security, noting that Hu Jintao repeatedly referred to ChinaÕs oil dependence as a security issue. However, he suggests that China is also simultaneously marketizing energy 44 . Leung et al. present a different perspective, sub-dividing energy security in China into relevant energy supply chains. They then survey how different energy supply chains are constructed as security issues in China, finding that oil supply chains are securitized Ôat the expense of improving the reliability of domestic electricity supplyÕ 10 . Thus, they argue that oil supply in particular is constructed as an issue of national security, as opposed to other issues relevant to energy security. In an interview with an official involved in the drafting of ChinaÕs 2012 energy white paper, they find that oil supply is constructed as a security issue specifically because it can threaten the Òself-relianceÓ of China in energy terms: the security of the state again remains at the centre here 10 . The emphasis on national security in ChinaÕs energy securitization is also noted elsewhere 45 . Leung et al. further suggest that although ChinaÕs energy security strategy has involved increasing engagement with the global oil market through the Ôgoing outÕ strategy adopted in the early 2000s, ensuring the stateÕs supply through diversification has remained key to energy security. Consequently, from this perspective Ôrisks to national energy security are something that affects the nation as a whole and is likely to originate externally, from other nationsÕ, so oil supply is more likely to be considered a security issue 10 .
A growing number of articles discuss the concept of energy security in China and what should be included or focused on. A survey of Chinese studies on energy security finds an overwhelming focus on oil and oil supply 46 , with one author noting that oil supply is the focus as it has been ChinaÕs key source of energy insecurity 28 . In discussions of oil supply, the international dimension is emphasised as the factor which potentially poses a threat 47 . It is notable (though not surprising) that discussions which consider both energy security and climate change are more likely to emphasise sustainability: Wang Tao argues that the definition and content of energy security has changed in the past decades, from security of supply and price to also emphasise sustainable development, environmental protection and social development 48 . He argues that the challenge of climate change on the energy system needs to be taken into consideration. Similarly, Chen Guohua argues that energy security is a non-traditional security issue, though he still links it closely with security of supply and demand 49 . Interestingly, a study of Chinese energy consumers found that while they rate fossil fuel supply as very important to energy security, there is growing concern over environmental consequences 50 .
Debates over different statesÕ approaches to energy security tend to point to two opposing policy-paths: market-centred or strategic 51 . The strategic dimension of ChinaÕs energy policy is often emphasised, as Chinese mainstream thinking on energy security is state-centric and heavily focused on oil supply, particularly self-sufficiency 52 and the energy system is still only partly marketised 53, 54 . China still to a degree emphasises the ÔstrategicÕ approach more strongly because energy is considered an issue of Ôhigh politicsÕ 55 , which suggests energy is in many ways understood in securitized terms as a priority issue. Lee also argues that the security dimension is key in internal Chinese thinking on energy security, noting that oil was singled out as a key security issue by Hu Jintao in 2003 56 . However, others suggest the meaning of energy security in China is opening up to include a stronger focus on sustainability 57 . More recently, it is suggested that thinking on energy security in China is opening up to a wider range of perspectives, including more focus on the market 43 , and an emphasis on cooperation over energy 26, 58 . A final perspective argues that China ÔhedgesÕ by using both a strategic and market approach to limit risk and maximise chances of survival (in the form of continued supplies) 44 .
Lastly, it is worth noting growing Chinese media attention to energy security, especially from 2005 onwards 59 . While energy security is generally covered mostly in specialist business and trade publications, it was also covered extensively in the PeopleÕs Daily, the primary mouthpiece of the CCP 59 . This study found a strong emphasis on the role of the state and national security in China, but also on sustainable development and the overall importance of maintaining Ôour countryÕs energy securityÕ and guaranteeing state/national energy security [ , baozhang nengyuan anquan]. Links to climate change were also prominent.
Security in ChinaÕs climate change debates
Overall, we have found more articles using securitization theory in the Chinese academic literature on climate change than in the literature on energy security, which suggests securitization theory has been more popular for studying climate change. However: climate change is only considered explicitly as a security issue in more recent literature, where a specifically Chinese notion of (non-traditional and non-Western) security is often emphasised. There is also a clear divide between the literature that focuses on global climate change or international climate change negotiations, and those who focus on the national level. Authors focusing on the international level tend to emphasise geopolitics and raise concerns that securitizing climate change in international negotiations may work to contain China. Meanwhile, studies of climate change which focus on the domestic or national level are more likely to be in favour of viewing climate change as a security threat in a wider sense, emphasising impact on environmental stability, human security and food/water security. This divide is often also mirrored in official discourse. It is worth noting that while a lot of literature on climate change also considers energy security, debates over energy security often overlook climate concerns 60 . However, awareness of ChinaÕs vulnerability to climate change has grown rapidly in the last decade, which is reflected in the expanding domestic academic literature on the topic. How to conceptualise the threat of climate change is central to this discussion, and this is where emerging literature on security and securitization fits in. Moreover, climate concerns have to be balanced with economic growth, which is also needed for social development and stability, and this makes dealing with the issue particularly difficult and potentially contentious.
Securitizing climate change in international climate change negotiations is a key area of focus. Here, the potential threat to ChinaÕs economic security is emphasised. For example, Ma Jianying and Jiang Yunlei argue that securitization of global climate change is a double-edged sword 61 . On the one hand, it promotes global cooperation by prioritising the issue. On the other hand, it could become an excuse for strong states to intervene in weak states. Securitization is here seen as an attempt or even as a tool used by Western states to politicize climate change 62 . In a similar vein, Chen Guohua argues that the international negotiations on climate change have posed strong challenges to ChinaÕs energy security 49 , suggesting that the outcome of the negotiations might increase the cost of ChinaÕs emission reductions. Highlighting the potential for Western states to use negotiations to control the future of global energy, Chen presents the negotiations as a threat to the economic security of developing countries including China. Thus, under this perspective, securitizing climate change on the international stage can be a threat to ChinaÕs own security. Using a similar geopolitical frame, Wang et al suggest that the Obama administration attempts to use climate change to contain the energy distribution of China and Russia, but that China needs to improve cooperation with these states over climate change as well as energy 63 . A different argument is forwarded by Pan, who argues that while securitization can facilitate international cooperation and change norms, it also risks framing other states as threats, which can harm cooperation 64 . Thus, he suggests that China should oppose securitization of global warming.
Overall, the literature on the domestic aspects of climate change is more positive towards securitizing the issue or viewing it as a threat to security 65 . Zhang argues in favour of China adopting a broader notion of national security to include climate change 65 . Wang Tao argues that China should use a development perspective to coordinate energy security and climate security as they overlap 48 . He suggests energy security involves providing sustainable, reliable energy, which needs to take future climate change into consideration, while the goal of Ôclimate securityÕ is to manage climate risks and thus achieve security and sustainable development of human society, which contains the key elements of energy security. Along a similar vein, Liu Yin argues that global warming poses problems for and pressures on ChinaÕs energy security, but can also bring opportunities to force China towards a more sustainable energy system 66 . There is also focus on climate change as a threat to ChinaÕs food security, and so by extension, to security more broadly.
A focus on climate change as a non-traditional security issue is a common theme in the domestic debate. Wang analyses how ecological issues, including climate change, are securitized 67 . She notes that non-traditional issues like climate change are increasingly ÔupgradedÕ in importance and considered issues of security in China. Na Li and Yang Nan argue that climate change is a threat to both traditional and non-traditional security 68 , climate change will intensify territorial disputes among countries and also threatens non-traditional security including food security, water shortage, human health, and climate migrants. Wang et al argue that climate change is closely related with national security, and that China in fact uses a Ònew concept of securityÓ which includes paying attention to increasing interaction between climate change, energy security, food and water security, as well as other emerging security concerns 63 .
Security and securitization are increasingly important in debates over climate change in China, but a wide range of perspectives is forwarded. Alongside the split between literature focusing on the international level and those concerned with climate change at the national or domestic level, there is increasing focus on a wider notion of security or non-traditional security. While the focus is often on national security, sometimes the threat emphasised is to ChinaÕs economy, energy security or resources, with food and water raised as central concerns, all of which are also at times seen as part of national security.
Official discourse: security in climate and energy policy discussions
The final section of this review considers Chinese official discourse on energy and climate change directly and the role that security plays here. In official discourse, energy security and climate change are increasingly linked. Energy consumption is key to ChinaÕs air pollution problems, as 60% of ChinaÕs air pollution comes from burning fossil fuels 69 . In 2014, ChinaÕs president Xi Jinping opened a meeting of ChinaÕs new National Security Council with a speech announcing a new Ôoverall security outlookÕ, including traditional and non-traditional security issues. While national security (Ôwith Chinese characteristicsÕ) was central throughout, he also emphasised the complex nature of ChinaÕs security challenges, listing 11 key areas of security, including economic security, resource security and ecological security, all of which are highly relevant here 70 and illustrate increasing emphasis on security in Chinese thinking on energy and climate issues. It also illustrates a clear broadening of the concept of security in Chinese politics.
To turn more specifically to energy, the growing popularity of the concept of Ôenergy securityÕ in China has already been noted. Energy has been considered a security issue in the official sense since the early 2000s, but what this actually means is gradually changing. ChinaÕs 10 Energy has been directly linked to national security both by Xi Jinping, and his predecessor Hu Jintao. However, there is a shift away from the early focus on oil supply and a more traditional national security approach, towards explicit focus on Ônon-traditionalÕ security issues and growing focus on the links between energy security and climate change. Climate change and energy demand in many ways work together to push China in the direction of sustainable energy supplies, as this could both ease emissions and dependence on imports. Sustainability is also increasingly noted as a security issue as a result (Ôecological securityÕ in XiÕs 2014 terminology).
Oil and oil supply remain important, with focus on ensuring supply as key to maintaining energy security 72 alongside marketization of the energy industry (though Ônational energy managementÕ is said to remain key to ensuring energy security) 73 . The stability of international energy markets is highlighted as a central concern for Chinese energy security. China is said to be Ôstriving to ensure a stable supply of energy with a steady increase in domestic energy productionÕ according to the 2007 white paper 72 . The 2012 white paper notes Ôgrave challenges to energy securityÕ, listing ChinaÕs increasing dependence on Ôforeign energy sourcesÕ in recent years, particularly oil 74 . However, it also mentions the need for Ôworking together to maintain energy securityÕ including managing energy to ensure a stable global market and working together to avoid disruptions to supply.
It is increasingly recognised that Ôthe development and use of energy, is one of the main causes of ecological destruction and environmental pollutionÕ 73 . Open recognition that Ôclimate change is interrelated with energy and should be addressed in integrated mannerÕ represents a clear change 75 . The head of the NEA has also pointed to energy security as a Ôpermanent concernÕ: ÔChina's population, natural resources, environment and the need for sustainable development do not allow wanton consumption of energy resourcesÕ 76 . Notably, the 2012 white paper goes further than 2007 white paper on environmental issues and sustainability, saying that the state Ôencourages fostering the concept of environment-friendly and low-carbon development, coordinates the development and use of energy resources with the protection of the ecoenvironment while paying equal attention to both, and actively fosters an energy development pattern that meets the requirements of ecological civilizationÕ 74 . It also notes the need to reduce consumption and pollution to provide Ôeconomical, clean and secure developmentÕ. Even more important for this discussion, it represents sustainability as an Ôimportant strategic taskÕ, including reducing consumption and pollution to provide Ôeconomical, clean and secure developmentÕ. Thus, we suggest that energy remains considered a security issue in Chinese official discourse, but the meaning of security is widening.
As has already been noted, climate change is a more recent concern for China and the importance of balancing it alongside the need for continued economic growth is continually emphasised. Overall, ChinaÕs official position on the extent to which climate change is a security issue is less clear. During the UN Security CouncilÕs first debate on climate change and conflict in 2007, China opposed securitization of climate change, calling it a development issue, though it did recognise that climate change could have some implications for security. In international forums, China has often framed climate change as a development issue, though this is also increasingly changing 77 . Rather than explicitly labelling climate change a security issue, the terms Ôsustainable securityÕ, Ôenvironmental securityÕ and Ôecological securityÕ are commonly used in China, but these usually include climate issues 77 .
Domestically, ChinaÕs first National Climate Change program was released in 2007. This was followed by a white paper on climate change in 2008, which did not explicitly label climate change a security issue, though the introduction states that climate change has Ôresulted in discernible impacts on the natural ecological systems of the Earth, and posed severe challenges to the survival and development of human societyÕ 78 : which mirrors what the Copenhagen School would call the grammar of security. White papers on climate change are now released on a yearly basis, which illustrates growing focus on the issue. To date, the white papers avoid using the word security. However, the 2012 white paper notes that the government attaches Ôgreat importanceÕ to climate change and the threat it poses to human lives and development 34 , and the most recent (2014) version notes that the government is Ôacutely aware of the problem of climate change and that China Ôfaces a grave ecological situation and must undertake the arduous task of addressing climate changeÕ 79 .
Chinese official discourse tends to avoid explicitly labelling climate change an issue of national security 80 . But the language used is often similar to the language of security, with a focus on the threats it poses to survival. The seriousness of the issue can also be seen in increasingly strong targets on emissions, efficiency, and energy production and consumption. Moreover, while climate change is rarely explicitly labelled an issue of national security, the term ecological security ( , shengtai anquan) is emerging as an increasingly important concept. It was part of Xi JinpingÕs list of key security challenges in 2014, and also plays an important role in ChinaÕs 2013 National Climate Change Adaptation Plan. In this document, climate change is considered as a Òserious threatÓ to ChinaÕs food security, water security, ecological security, energy security, operational security of cities and towns, and security of life and property 81 . Climate change is also explicitly mentioned as an increasingly prominent threat in ChinaÕs 2008 Defense white paper, but ChinaÕs military has so far paid less attention to climate change than say the US Defence Department 82 .
Thus, there is increasing use of security language though itÕs not always explicitly linked to climate change (for example in Premier Li KeqiangÕs declaration of a ÔwarÕ on pollution 83 ).
Declaring a war on pollution is not necessarily equivalent to securitization, and it doesnÕt necessarily trigger emergency action. However, it does serve an important function, signalling to the domestic public that the issue is taken seriously. China is also taking action to deal with pollution. While such policies may not be considered emergency action in the Copenhagen School sense of military threat-defense measures, it is a form of ÔdefenseÕ against a nontraditional threat.
Although China tends to construct climate change as an economic or a development issue, key actors and documents increasingly draw on the language of priority and survival, emphasising the urgency of the issue. As noted in the discussion on energy, sustainability is also increasingly considered to be a ÔstrategicÕ task. It is often difficult to separate these different goals -ChinaÕs sustainable development policy aims to balance economic growth with environmental protection, ultimately in the aim of national security 84 . Lastly, there is perhaps less need to securitize climate change in China than in Western states. Securitization often aims to convince the audience (in the form of the general public) of the need to take action on a particular threat. However, in the Chinese political system Ð and given the very visible impact of air pollution in ChinaÕs cities Ð there is less of a need to explicitly label the issue as security or to highlight the threat. Indeed, highlighting the threat may even stoke public discontent and thus be counterproductive to stability.
Implications and conclusion
ÔSecurityÕ and securitization play an interesting role in ChinaÕs energy and climate politics. Energy is clearly more closely linked with national security overall, but the connection between the two issues is increasingly emphasised. Moreover, both energy security and climate change discussions illustrate the increasing importance of and focus on non-traditional security issues in China. Security Ôwith Chinese characteristicsÕ is becoming increasingly important as a way to illustrate the uniqueness and complexity of ChinaÕs challenges. We have shown bourgeoning academic interest in these issues alongside a discussion of official discourse to illustrate the importance of understanding how China approaches and understands energy security and climate change.
While securitization theory is rarely used to study non-Western contexts, we have contributed to literature showing that while the dynamics of securitization may differ, the process still occurs. Using securitization to understand the political dynamics of security in China highlights how some issues become prioritised over others: both in terms of specific energy sources, in this case oil supply, and in terms of policy areas, as energy and economic security remain prioritised above climate change. Thus, while securitization dynamics differ because authority and legitimacy work differently, the language and grammar of security still play an important role in legitimation and prioritisation. Securitization theory helps us to highlight the growing role and some of the potential implications of the growing importance of security politics in China under Xi Jinping, while the broadening of the concept of security in China could be an interesting area of further research. In the Chinese context, the common critique that securitization leads to statecentred responses could be seen to be less significant, as the responses to most problems are state-centred. Additionally, if security is not linked with emergency politics or politics deemed to be ÔworseÕ than regular politics, the argument that securitization is best avoided no longer holds.
In real terms, ChinaÕs energy consumption Ð in particular its coal dependence Ð poses an increasing threat to global environmental stability as well as the countryÕs own ecological security. China is still developing its approaches to energy and climate change, and is also increasingly linking the two issues together. The dynamics of securitization differ, and there is growing focus on non-traditional security issues. This also suggests that securitization may not be best avoided. Clearly, a contextualised approach is needed to study securitization in practice, in particular when studying securitization in a non-Western context. Ultimately, climate change will pose challenges to ChinaÕs security Ð national security, environmental security and energy security, alongside human security and water security. Securitization is one potential way to approach it. But energy and climate security also have to be balanced alongside other important security concerns, including economic security and development, so there is no simple solution here.
One of the biggest challenges remains ChinaÕs weak energy governance, which makes policy implementation difficult. Use of renewable energy in China is increasing, but significant obstacles remain 85 . One alternative is to consider energy conservation as a security issue 86 Ð after all, it would ease both energy security and climate change. Energy security and climate change are two of the most serious issues facing ChinaÕs continued development. Its policy choices play a key role in shaping global climate and energy dynamics. Thus, we argue that the growing importance of ÔsecurityÕ in ChinaÕs energy and climate debates is an important area for further research, alongside the implications of securitization in these cases. 
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